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1
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- The Convention at Philadelphia
provided a constitution with a dual attitude: it was proparty in one
sense and antiparty in another. The authors of the Constitution refused
to suppress the parties by destroying the fundamental liberties in which
parties originate.
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2
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- They or their immediate successors accepted amendments that guaranteed
civil rights and thus established a system of party tolerance, i.e., the
right to agitate and to organize. This is the pro-party aspect of the
system.
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3
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- On the other hand, the authors of the Constitution set up an elaborate
division and balance of powers within an intricate governmental
structure designed to make parties ineffective.
- It was hoped that the parties would lose and exhaust themselves in
futile attempts to fight their way through the labyrinthine framework of
the government, much as an attacking army is expected to spend itself
against the defensive works of a fortress.
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4
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- In Madison’s mind the difference between an autocracy and a free
republic seems to have been largely a matter of the precise point at
which parties are stopped by the government.
- In an autocracy parties are controlled (suppressed) at the source; in a
republic parties are tolerated but are invited to strangle themselves in
the machinery of government. The result in either case is much the same,
sooner or later the government checks the parties but never do the
parties control the government.
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5
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- Madison was perfectly definite and unmistakable in his disapproval of
party government as distinguished from party tolerance. In the opinion
of Madison, parties were intrinsically bad, and the sole issue for
discussion was the means by which bad parties might be prevented from
becoming dangerous.
- What never seems to have occurred to the authors of the Constitution,
however, is that parties might be used as beneficent instruments of
popular government.
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6
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- People who write about interests sometimes seem to assume that all
interests are special and exclusive, setting up as a result of this
assumption a dichotomy in which the interests on the one side are
perpetually opposed to the public welfare on the other side.
- But there are common interests as well as special interests, and common
interests resemble special interests in that they are apt to influence
political behavior. The raw materials of politics are not all
antisocial.
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7
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- People have many interests leading to a dispersion of drives certain to
destroy some of the unanimity and concentration of any group.
- How many interests can an individual have? Enough to make it extremely
unlikely that any two individuals will have the same combination of
interests.
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8
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- Interests compete with interests for the attention and enthusiasm of
every individual.
- the fact that every individual is torn by the diversity of his own
interests, the fact that he is a member of many groups, is the law of
the imperfect political mobilization of interests. That is, it has never
been possible to mobilize any interest 100 percent.
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9
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- In view of the fact, therefore,
- (1) that there are many interests, including a great body of common
interests,
- (2) that the government pursues a multiplicity of policies and creates
and destroys interests in the process,
- (3) that each individual is capable of having many interests,
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10
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- (4) that interests cannot be mobilized perfectly, and
- (5) that conflicts among interests are not cumulative, it seems
reasonable to suppose that the government is not the captive of blind
forces from which there is no escape. There is nothing wrong about the
raw materials of politics
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