Notes
Slide Show
Outline
1
Party Government
E. E. Schattschneider
  •  The Convention at Philadelphia provided a constitution with a dual attitude: it was proparty in one sense and antiparty in another. The authors of the Constitution refused to suppress the parties by destroying the fundamental liberties in which parties originate.
2
The Constitution As Pro-Party
  • They or their immediate successors accepted amendments that guaranteed civil rights and thus established a system of party tolerance, i.e., the right to agitate and to organize. This is the pro-party aspect of the system.
3
The Constitution as Anti-Party
  • On the other hand, the authors of the Constitution set up an elaborate division and balance of powers within an intricate governmental structure designed to make parties ineffective.


  • It was hoped that the parties would lose and exhaust themselves in futile attempts to fight their way through the labyrinthine framework of the government, much as an attacking army is expected to spend itself against the defensive works of a fortress.
4
Madison on Parties
  • In Madison’s mind the difference between an autocracy and a free republic seems to have been largely a matter of the precise point at which parties are stopped by the government.


  • In an autocracy parties are controlled (suppressed) at the source; in a republic parties are tolerated but are invited to strangle themselves in the machinery of government. The result in either case is much the same, sooner or later the government checks the parties but never do the parties control the government.
5
Madison Disapproved of Party Government
  • Madison was perfectly definite and unmistakable in his disapproval of party government as distinguished from party tolerance. In the opinion of Madison, parties were intrinsically bad, and the sole issue for discussion was the means by which bad parties might be prevented from becoming dangerous.


  • What never seems to have occurred to the authors of the Constitution, however, is that parties might be used as beneficent instruments of popular government.
6
The Raw Materials of Politics
  • People who write about interests sometimes seem to assume that all interests are special and exclusive, setting up as a result of this assumption a dichotomy in which the interests on the one side are perpetually opposed to the public welfare on the other side.


  • But there are common interests as well as special interests, and common interests resemble special interests in that they are apt to influence political behavior. The raw materials of politics are not all antisocial.
7
Multiple Interests
  • People have many interests leading to a dispersion of drives certain to destroy some of the unanimity and concentration of any group.


  • How many interests can an individual have? Enough to make it extremely unlikely that any two individuals will have the same combination of interests.
8
The Law of the Imperfect Political Mobilization of Interests
  • Interests compete with interests for the attention and enthusiasm of every individual.


  • the fact that every individual is torn by the diversity of his own interests, the fact that he is a member of many groups, is the law of the imperfect political mobilization of interests. That is, it has never been possible to mobilize any interest 100 percent.
9
Effect of Pluralism
  • In view of the fact, therefore,


  • (1) that there are many interests, including a great body of common interests,


  • (2) that the government pursues a multiplicity of policies and creates and destroys interests in the process,


  • (3) that each individual is capable of having many interests,
10
Government Not the Captive of Special Interests

  • (4) that interests cannot be mobilized perfectly, and


  • (5) that conflicts among interests are not cumulative, it seems reasonable to suppose that the government is not the captive of blind forces from which there is no escape. There is nothing wrong about the raw materials of politics