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- A recurring and important theme of commentators on the American
political system is that the separation of powers between the president
and Congress produces a deadlock of democracy.
- Critics of divided government have proposed more disciplined political
parties to unify the president and Congress, thereby helping to overcome
the effects of the separation of powers.
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- The Party Model of Government requires unified party control of the
executive and the legislature.
- David Mayhew presents the provocative and important thesis that the
divided government, which the separation of powers produces, works as
well as the unified government that party discipline would create.
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- Background:
- dSince World War II, divided party control of the American national
government has come to seem normal. Between the 1946 and 1990 elections,
one of the two parties held the presidency, the Senate, and the House
simultaneously for eighteen of those years. But control was divided for
twenty-six years
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- Of course, divided control is not a new phenomenon. During a
twenty-two-year stretch between 1874 and 1896, to take the extreme case,
the two parties shared control of the government for sixteen years.
- But after that, the country settled into a half-century habit of unified
control broken only by two-year transitions from one party's monopoly to
the other's that closed out the Taft, Wilson, and Hoover
administrations. [Unified party control characterized the administration
of FDR from 1933-1945.]
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- Should we care whether party control is unified or divided? That depends
on whether having one state of affairs rather than the other makes any
important difference. Does it?
- Much received thinking says yes. The political party, according to one
of political science's best-known axioms about the American system, is "the
indispensable instrument that [brings] cohesion and unity, and hence
effectiveness, to the government as a whole by linking the executive and
legislative branches in a bond of common interest."
- In the words of Woodrow Wilson, "You cannot compound a successful
government out of antagonisms."
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- Randall B. Ripley argued in a 1969 study, for example: "To have a
productive majority in the American system of government the President
and a majority of both houses must be from the same party. Such a
condition does not guarantee legislative success but is necessary for
it."
- V. O. Key, Jr., wrote: "Common partisan control of executive and
legislature does not assure energetic government, but division of party
control precludes it."
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- Another familiar claim has to do with congressional oversight. It is
that Congress acting as an investigative body will give more trouble to
the executive branch when a president of the opposite party holds power.
- That propensity can be viewed as bad or good. Woodrow Wilson might say
that accelerated probing of the executive provides just another kind of
unfortunate "antagonism." From another perspective, it can be
expected to keep presidents and bureaucrats in line better.
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- No evidence that unified government is better government
- Unified government does not produce better domestic public policy
- Unified government does not affect foreign policy
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- But short of jettisoning the separation-of-powers core of the
Constitution--an unlikely event--it would probably be a mistake to
channel such concern into "party government" schemes.
- This work has tried to show that, surprisingly, it does not seem to make
all that much difference whether party control of the American
government happens to be unified or divided. One reason we assume it
does is that "party government" plays a role in political
science somewhere between a Platonic form and a grail
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- When we reach for [party government] as a standard, we draw on abstract
models, presumed European practice, and well-airbrushed American
experience, but we seldom take a cold look at real American experience.
- We forget about Franklin Roosevelt's troubles with HUAC and the Rules
Committee, Truman's and Kennedy's domestic policy defeats, McCarthy's
square-off against Eisenhower, Johnson versus Fulbright on Vietnam, and
Carter's energy program and "malaise."
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- Political parties can be powerful instruments, but in the United States
they seem to play more of a role as "policy factions" than as,
in the British case, governing instruments.
- To demand more of American parties-to ask that they become governing
instruments-is to run them up against components of the American regime
as fundamental as the party system itself.
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- There is a strong pluralist component, for example, as evidenced in the
way politicians respond to cross-cutting issue cleavages.
- There is a public-opinion component that political science’s modern
technologies do not seem to reach very well. The government floats in
public opinion; it goes up and down on great long waves of it that often
have little to do with parties.
- There is the obvious structural component in the separation of power
that brings on deadlock and chronic conflict, but also nudges officials
toward deliberation, compromise, and super-majority outcomes.
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- And there is a component of deep-seated individualism among American
politicians, who build and tend their own electoral bases and maintain
their own relations of responsibility with electorates.
- This seems to be a matter of political culture, perhaps a survival of
republicanism, that goes way back.
- Unlike most politicians elsewhere, American ones at both legislative and
executive levels have managed to navigate the last two centuries of
history without becoming minions of party leaders. In this complicated,
multi-component setting, British-style governing by party majorities
does not have much of a chance.
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