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- Background:
- Washington and Adams Appointed
Only Federalists to the Federal Courts
- When the opposing Republicans won
the election of 1800, the Jeffersonians found that while they controlled
the presidency and Congress, the Federalists still dominated the
judiciary.
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2
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- One of the first acts of the new administration was to repeal the
Judiciary Act of 1800, which had created a number of new judgeships.
- Although President Adams had attempted to fill the vacancies prior to
the end of his term, a number of commissions had not been delivered, and
one of the appointees, William Marbury, sued Secretary of State James
Madison to force him to deliver his commission as a justice of the
peace.
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3
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- The new chief justice, John Marshall, understood that if the Court
awarded Marbury a writ of mandamus (an order to force Madison to deliver
the commission) the Jefferson administration would ignore it, and thus
significantly weaken the authority of the courts.
- On the other hand, if the Court denied the writ, it might well appear
that the justices had acted out of fear. Either case would be a denial
of the basic principle of the supremacy of the law.
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4
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- Marshall's decision in this case has been hailed as a judicial tour de
force.
- In essence, he declared that Madison should have delivered the
commission to Marbury, but then held that the section of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 that gave the Supreme Court the power to issue writs of
mandamus exceeded the authority allotted the Court under Article III of
the Constitution, and was therefore null and void.
- Thus he was able to chastise the Jeffersonians and yet not create a
situation in which a court order would be flouted
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- 1. The applicant a right to the commission he demands
- The President has violated the right of Marbury to his commission by
ordering his Secretary of State (Madison) to withhold delivery
- The appropriate remedy is the issuance of the judicial writ of mandamus,
which directs a judge or government official to perform his legal duty
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- If [Marbury] has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws
of his country afford him a remedy?
- The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury.
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- One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. In
Great Britain the king himself is sued in the respectful form of a
petition, and he never fails to comply with the judgment of his court.
- The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve
this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation
of a vested legal right.
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- In his Commentaries Blackstone states, 'it is a general and indisputable
rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by
suit or action at law whenever that right is invaded.'
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- And afterwards, [Blackstone] says, 'I am next to consider such injuries
as are cognizable by the courts of common law. And herein I shall for
the present only remark, that all possible injuries whatsoever, that did
not fall within the exclusive cognizance of either the ecclesiastical,
military, or maritime tribunals, are, for that very reason, within the
cognizance of the common law courts of justice;
- for it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England,
that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury
its proper redress.'
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- It follows then that the question, whether the legality of an act of the
head of a department be examinable in a court of justice or not, must
always depend on the nature of that act.
- If some acts be examinable, and others not, there must be some rule of
law to guide the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
- In some instances there may be difficulty in applying the rule to
particular cases; but there cannot, it is believed, be much difficulty
in laying down the rule
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11
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- By the constitution of the United States, the president is invested with
certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to
use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his
political character, and to his own conscience.
- To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to
appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity
with his orders.
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- In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be
entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used,
still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion.
- The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual
rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the
executive is conclusive.
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- The application of this remark will be perceived by adverting to the act
of congress for establishing the department of foreign affairs.
- This officer, as his duties were prescribed by that act, is to conform
precisely to the will of the president. He is the mere organ by whom
that will is communicated. The acts of such an officer, as an officer,
can never be examinable by the courts.
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- But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other
duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when
the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those
acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for
his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights
of others.
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- The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of
departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive,
merely to execute the will of the president, or rather to act in cases
in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion,
nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only
politically examinable.
- But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights
depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that
the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to
the laws of his country for a remedy.
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- Blackstone defines a mandamus to be, 'a command issuing in the king's
name from the court of king's bench, and directed to any person,
corporation, or inferior court of judicature within the king's
dominions, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified
which appertains to their office and duty, and which the court of king's
bench has previously determined, or at least supposes, to be consonant
to right and justice.'
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- Lord Mansfield, in 3 Burrows, 1266, in the case of The King v. Baker et
al. states with much precision and explicitness the cases in which this
writ may be used.
- 'Whenever,' says that very able judge, 'there is a right to execute an
office, perform a service, or exercise a franchise (more especially if
it be in a matter of public concern or attended with profit), and a
person is kept out of possession, or dispossessed of such right, and has
no other specific legal remedy, this court ought to assist by mandamus,
upon reasons of justice, as the writ expresses, and upon reasons of
public policy, to preserve peace, order and good government.'
- In the same case he says, 'this writ ought to be used upon all occasions
where the law has established no specific remedy, and where in justice
and good government there ought to be one.'
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- This writ, if awarded, would be directed to an officer of government,
and its mandate to him would be, to use the words of Blackstone, 'to do
a particular thing therein specified, which appertains to his office and
duty, and which the court has previously determined or at least supposes
to be consonant to right and justice.'
- Or, in the words of Lord Mansfield, the applicant, in this case, has a
right to execute an office of public concern, and is kept out of
possession of that right.
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- These circumstances certainly concur in this case.
- Still, to render the mandamus a proper remedy, the officer to whom it is
to be directed, must be one to whom, on legal principles, such writ may
be directed; and the person applying for it must be without any other
specific and legal remedy.
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- 1. With respect to the officer to whom it would be directed. The
intimate political relation, subsisting between the president of the
United States and the heads of departments, necessarily renders any
legal investigation of the acts of one of those high officers peculiarly
irksome, as well as delicate; and excites some hesitation with respect
to the propriety of entering into such investigation.
- Impressions are often received without much reflection or examination;
and it is not wonderful that in such a case as this, the assertion, by
an individual, of his legal claims in a court of justice, to which
claims it is the duty of that court to attend, should at first view be
considered by some, as an attempt to intrude into the cabinet, and to
intermeddle with the prerogatives of the executive.
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- It has already been stated that the applicant has, to that commission, a
vested legal right, of which the executive cannot deprive him.
- He has been appointed to an office, from which he is not removable at
the will of the executive; and being so appointed, he has a right to the
commission which the secretary has received from the president for his
use. The act of congress does not indeed order the secretary of state to
send it to him, but it is placed in his hands for the person entitled to
it; and cannot be more lawfully withheld by him, than by another person.
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- This, then, is a plain case of a mandamus, either to deliver the
commission, or a copy of it from the record; and it only remains to be
inquired,
- Whether it can issue from this court.
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- The act [Judiciary Act of 1789] to establish the judicial courts of the
United States authorizes the supreme court 'to issue writs of mandamus,
in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts
appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United
States.'
- The secretary of state, being a person, holding an office under the
authority of the United States, is precisely within the letter of the
description; and if this court is not authorized to issue a writ of
mandamus to such an officer, it must be because the law is
unconstitutional, and therefore absolutely incapable of conferring the
authority, and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer
and assign.
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- The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in
one supreme court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time
to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all
cases arising under the laws of the United States; and consequently, in
some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the right
claimed is given by a law of the United States.
- In the distribution of this power it is declared that 'the supreme court
shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be
a party. In all other cases, the supreme court shall have appellate
jurisdiction.'
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- To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to
exercise appellate jurisdiction.
- It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be
exercised in a variety of forms, and that if it be the will of the
legislature that a mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will
must be obeyed. This is true; yet the jurisdiction must be appellate,
not original.
- It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises
and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not
create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to
courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a
paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original action for that
paper, and therefore seems not to belong to appellate, but to
original jurisdiction.
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- The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act
establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue [in
original jurisdiction] writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not
to be warranted by the constitution; and it becomes necessary to inquire
whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised.
- The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become
the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United
States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest.
It seems only necessary to recognise certain principles, supposed to
have been long and well established, to decide it.
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- Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate
them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and
consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of
the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.
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- It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.
- Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule.
- If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution: if
both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that
the court must either decide that case conformably to the law,
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution,
disregarding the law: the court must determine which of these
conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of
judicial duty.
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- Article III of the Constitution does not textually give the Supreme the
authority to issue writs of mandamus in original jurisdiction.
- Therefore the Judiciary Act of 1789 insofar as it gives the Supreme
Court the power to issue writs of mandamus in original jurisdiction is
unconstitutional.
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