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1
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- Energy in the Executive is a
leading character in the definition of good government.
- A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A
feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a
government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in
practice, a bad government.
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2
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- [Energy in the Executive] is essential to the protection of the
community against foreign attacks;
- [Energy in the Executive] is not less essential to the steady
administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those
irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the
ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the
enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.
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3
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- Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in
the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only remain to inquire,
what are the ingredients which constitute this energy?
- How far can they be combined with those other ingredients which
constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this
combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the
convention?
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4
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- The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first,
unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its
support; fourthly, competent powers.
- The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are,
first, a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due responsibility.
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5
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- That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision,
activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the
proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the
proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is
increased, these qualities will be diminished.
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6
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- In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a
benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that
department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct
salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and
serve to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once
taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law, and
resistance to it punishable.
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7
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- No favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of
dissension in the executive department.
- Here, they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease
to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan
or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final
conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the
Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition --
vigor and expedition, and this without any counterbalancing good.
- In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the
bulwark of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended
from its plurality.
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8
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- One of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive is that
it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility.
- Responsibility is of two kinds -- to censure and to punishment. The
first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective
office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as
to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a
manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the
multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in
either case.
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9
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- It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on
whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of
pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to
another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances,
that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author.
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10
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- It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the
Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities
they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power
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11
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- first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as
well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures
among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to
fall; and,
- second, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the
misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal
from office or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.
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12
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- In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which
has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable
for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can
be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional
council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give.
Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive
department
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13
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- But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally
responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the British
Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to
apply, but turns against the institution.
- In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the
prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some
degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior.
- In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly
diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief
Magistrate himself.
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14
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- Prior to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an
intelligent man from any of the States, who did not admit, as the result
of experience, that the UNITY of the executive of this State was one of
the best of the distinguishing features of our constitution.
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15
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- The Founders conspicuously and very consciously declined to sap the
Executive's strength in the same way they had weakened the Legislature:
by dividing the executive power. Proposals to have multiple executives,
or a council of advisers with separate authority were rejected. (Scalia,
dissenting in Morrison v. Olson, 1988)
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