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- Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.
- On the 10th day of May, 1865, Lambdin P. Milligan presented a petition
to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana,
to be discharged from an alleged unlawful imprisonment.
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- The case made by the petition is this:
- Milligan is a citizen of the United States; has lived for twenty years
in Indiana; and, at the time of the grievances complained of, was not,
and never had been in the military or naval service of the United
States.
- On the 5th day of October, 1864, while at home, he was arrested by order
of General Alvin P. Hovey, commanding the military district of Indiana;
and has ever since been kept in close confinement.
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3
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- On the 21st day of October, 1864, he was brought before a military
commission, convened at Indianapolis, by order of General Hovey, tried
on certain charges and specifications; found guilty, and sentenced to be
hanged; and the sentence ordered to be executed on Friday, the 19th day
of May, 1865.
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- On the 2d day of January, 1865, after the proceedings of the military
commission were at an end, the Circuit Court of the United States for
Indiana met at Indianapolis and empanelled a grand jury, who were
charged to inquire whether the laws of the United States had been
violated; and, if so, to make presentments.
- The court adjourned on the 27th day of January, having, prior thereto,
discharged from further service the grand jury, who did not find any
bill of indictment or make any presentment against Milligan for any
offence whatever; and, in fact, since his imprisonment, no bill of
indictment has been found or presentment made against him by any grand
jury of the United States.
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5
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- Milligan insists that said military commission had no jurisdiction to
try him upon the charges preferred, or upon any charges whatever;
- because he was a citizen of the United States and the State of Indiana,
and had not been, since the commencement of the late Rebellion, a
resident of any of the States whose citizens were arrayed against the
government, and that the right of trial by jury was guaranteed to him by
the Constitution of the United States.
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- The prayer of the petition was, that under the act of Congress, approved
March 3d, 1863, entitled, 'An act relating to habeas corpus and
regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases,' he may be brought
before the court, and either turned over to the proper civil tribunal to
be proceeded against according to the law of the land or discharged from
custody altogether.
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- The importance of the main question presented by this record cannot be
overstated; for it involves the very framework of the government and the
fundamental principles of American liberty.
- During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did not allow
that calmness in deliberation and discussion so necessary to a correct
conclusion of a purely judicial question. Then, considerations of safety
were mingled with the exercise of power; and feelings and interests
prevailed which are happily terminated.
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- Now that the public safety is assured, this question, as well as all
others, can be discussed and decided without passion or the admixture of
any element not required to form a legal judgment.
- We approach the investigation of this case, fully sensible of the
magnitude of the inquiry and the necessity of full and cautious
deliberation.
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- The controlling question in the case is this: Upon the facts stated in
Milligan's petition, and the exhibits filed, had the military commission
mentioned in it jurisdiction, legally, to try and sentence him?
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- Milligan, not a resident of one of the rebellious states, or a prisoner
of war, but a citizen of Indiana for twenty years past, and never in the
military or naval service, is, while at his home, arrested by the
military power of the United States,
- imprisoned, and, on certain criminal charges preferred against him,
tried, convicted, and sentenced to be hanged by a military commission,
organized under the direction of the military commander of the military
district of Indiana.
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11
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- No graver question was ever considered by this court, nor one which more
nearly concerns the rights of the whole people; for it is the birthright
of every American citizen when charged with crime, to be tried and
punished according to law.
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- Every trial involves the exercise of judicial power; and from what
source did not military commission that tried him derive their
authority? Certainly no part of judicial power of the country was
conferred on them; because the Constitution expressly vests it 'in one
supreme court and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish,' and it is not pretended that the commission
was a court ordained and established by Congress.
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- But it is said that the jurisdiction is complete under the 'laws and
usages of war.‘
- It can serve no useful purpose to inquire what those laws and usages
are, whence they originated, where found, and on whom they operate;
- they can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the
authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their
process unobstructed.
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- Another guarantee of freedom was broken when Milligan was denied a trial
by jury.
- Until recently no one ever doubted that the right of trial by jury was
fortified in the organic law against the power of attack.
- It is now assailed; but if ideas can be expressed in words, and language
has any meaning, this right-one of the most valuable in a free
country-is preserved to every one accused of crime who is not attached
to the army, or navy, or militia in actual service.
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15
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- It is claimed that martial law covers with its broad mantle the
proceedings of this military commission.
- The proposition is this: that in a time of war the commander of an armed
force (if in his opinion the exigencies of the country demand it, and of
which he is to judge), has the power, within the lines of his military
district,
- to suspend all civil rights and their remedies, and subject citizens as
well as soldiers to the rule of his will;
- and in the exercise of his lawful authority cannot be restrained, except
by his superior officer or the President of the United States.
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- If this position is sound to the extent claimed, then when war exists,
foreign or domestic, and the country is subdivided into military
departments for mere convenience,
- the commander of one of them can, if he chooses, within his limits, on
the plea of necessity, with the approval of the Executive, substitute
military force for and to the exclusion of the laws, and punish all
persons, as he thinks right and proper, without fixed or certain rules.
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- Unquestionably, there is then an exigency which demands that the
government, if it should see fit in the exercise of a proper discretion
to make arrests, should not be required to produce the persons arrested
in answer to a writ of habeas corpus.
- The Constitution goes no further. It does not say after a writ of habeas
corpus is denied a citizen, that he shall be tried otherwise than by the
course of the common law; if it had intended this result, it was easy by
the use of direct words to have accomplished it. The illustrious men who
framed that instrument were guarding the foundations of civil liberty
against the abuses of unlimited power;
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- It follows, from what has been said on this subject, that there are
occasions when martial rule can be properly applied.
- If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed,
and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law,
then, on the theatre of active military operations, where war really
prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil
authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and
society; and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to
govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course.
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- From the first year of the reign of Edward the Third, when the
Parliament of England reversed the attainder of the Earl of Lancaster,
because he could have been tried by the courts of the realm, and
declared, 'that in time of peace no man ought to be adjudged to death
for treason or any other offence without being arraigned and held to
answer;
- and that regularly when the king's courts are open it is a time of peace
in judgment of law,' down to the present day, martial law, as claimed in
this case, has been condemned by all respectable English jurists as
contrary to the fundamental laws of the land, and subversive of the
liberty of the subject.
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- But the opinion which has just been read asserts not only that the
military commission held in Indiana was not authorized by Congress, but
that it was not in the power of Congress to authorize it; from which it
may be thought to follow, that Congress has no power to indemnify the
officers who composed the commission against liability in civil courts
for acting as members of it.
- We cannot agree to this.
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- And we concur, also, in what is said of the writ of habeas corpus, and
of its suspension, with two reservations:
- (1.) That, in our judgment, when the writ is suspended, the Executive is
authorized to arrest as well as to detain; and
- (2.) that there are cases in which, the privilege of the writ being
suspended, trial and punishment by military commission, in states where
civil courts are open, may be authorized by Congress, as well as arrest
and detention.
- We think that Congress had power, though not exercised, to authorize the
military commission which was held in Indiana.
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