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1
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- Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must
perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each
other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be
the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because
it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.
- The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the
community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes
the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be
regulated.
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2
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- The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword
or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of
the society; and can take no active resolution whatever.
- It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm
even for the efficacy of its judgments.
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3
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- I agree, that "there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not
separated from the legislative and executive powers.“
- And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to
fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every thing to fear from
its union with either of the other departments;
- that as all the effects of such a union must ensue from a dependence of
the former on the latter, notwithstanding a nominal and apparent
separation;
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4
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- that as, from the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in
continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its
co-ordinate branches;
- and that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and
independence as permanency in office, this quality may therefore be
justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and,
in a great measure, as the citadel of the public justice and the public
security.
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5
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- The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly
essential in a limited Constitution.
- By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain
specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance,
as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and
the like.
- Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than
through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution
void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or
privileges would amount to nothing.
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6
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- Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce
legislative acts void, because contrary to the Constitution, has arisen
from an imagination that the doctrine would imply a superiority of the
judiciary to the legislative power.
- It is urged that the authority which can declare the acts of another
void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared
void
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7
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- There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that
every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the
commission under which it is exercised, is void.
- No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be
valid.
- To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his
principal; that the servant is above his master; that the
representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves;
that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their powers
do not authorize, but what they forbid.
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8
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- If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the
constitutional judges of their own powers [as Jefferson argued when he
became President], and that the construction they put upon them is
conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered,
- that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be
collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution.
- It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could intend
to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to
that of their constituents.
- It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be
an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order,
among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to
their authority.
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9
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- The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of
the courts.
- A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a
fundamental law.
- It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.
- If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two,
that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to
be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred
to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their
agents.
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10
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- Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the
judicial to the legislative power.
- It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both; and
that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands
in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the
judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former.
- They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather
than by those which are not fundamental.
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11
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- It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a
repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional
intentions of the legislature.
- This might as well happen in the case of two contradictory statutes; or
it might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute.
- The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be
disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would
equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative
body.
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12
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- The observation, if it prove any thing, would prove that there ought to
be no judges distinct from that body.
- If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of
a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this
consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of
judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that
independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful
performance of so arduous a duty
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13
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- This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular
conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves,
- and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and
more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to
occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious
oppressions of the minor party in the community.
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14
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- But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only, that
the independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the
effects of occasional ill humors in the society.
- These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of the private
rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws.
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15
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- Lord Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke:
- And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will
controul acts of parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly
void: for when an act of parliament is against common right and reason,
or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will
controul it, and adjudge such act to be void;
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16
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- Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance
in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such laws.
- It not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which
may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the legislative
body in passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of
iniquitous intention are to be expected from the scruples of the courts,
are in a manner compelled, by the very motives of the injustice they
meditate, to qualify their attempts.
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17
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- There is yet a further and a weightier reason for the permanency of the
judicial offices, which is deducible from the nature of the
qualifications they require.
- It has been frequently remarked, with great propriety, that a voluminous
code of laws is one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with the
advantages of a free government.
- To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that
they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to
define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes
before them
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18
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- the records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very
considerable bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a
competent knowledge of them.
- Hence it is, that there can be but few men in the society who will have
sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the stations of judges.
- And making the proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of human
nature, the number must be still smaller of those who unite the
requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge.
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19
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- a temporary duration in office, which would naturally discourage such
characters from quitting a lucrative line of practice to accept a seat
on the bench, would have a tendency to throw the administration of
justice into hands less able, and less well qualified, to conduct it
with utility and dignity.
- In the present circumstances of this country, and in those in which it
is likely to be for a long time to come, the disadvantages on this score
would be greater than they may at first sight appear; but it must be
confessed, that they are far inferior to those which present themselves
under the other aspects of the subject.
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